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CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
The commerce power is the power to regulate.' It binds the
nation into a single economic unit and bars local burdens on inter-
state trade.2 The commerce power operates in a vast array of
spheres: from wages and working conditions in local factories3 to
corporate acquisitions,4 shipment of adulterated food,5 racial dis-
crimination,6 price fixing,7 loan sharking,' and infinitely much
more.
9
Because it is "one of the most prolific sources of national
power," the Commerce Clause can be a source of conflict with
state law.'0 And when wielded too broadly, it can usurp the role
of the states. Thus, courts have long recognized the need to main-
tain the distinction between what is truly national and what is
merely local."
Historically, a clear line of demarcation differentiated national
and local police power, relegating the federal government to a
minor role in defining crimes and enforcing criminal laws.'2 But
as commerce inexorably forged a national economy, the line began
to blur. And when technological progress ushered in the era of
modem transportation, the rapid circulation of goods in commerce
1. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
2. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1949) ("This princi-
ple that our economic unit is the Nation . . . has as its corollary that the states are not
separable economic units .... ").
3. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 602, 605 (1939) (construing § 2(6) of
the National Labor Relations Act).
4. See, e.g., United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 275
(1975) (construing § 7 of the Clayton Act).
5. See, e.g., Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 51 (1911) (construing
§ 10 of the Food and Drug Act).
6. See, e.g., Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 301 (1969); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294, 298 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 245
(1964) (all construing § 201 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
7. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219, 227 (1948) (construing § I of the Sherman Act).
8. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 146-47 (1971) (construing Title II
of the Consumer Credit Protection Act).
9. See, e.g., infra notes 68-75, 80 and accompanying text.
10. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-35 (1949).
11. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
12. Primary criminal jurisdiction remained with the states because crime was viewed as
a distinctly local concern. John S. Baker, Jr., Nationalizing Criminal Law: Does Organized
Crime Make It Necessary or Proper?, 16 RUTGERS L.J. 495, 502 (1985).
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created the need for national regulation' 3-hence, the rise of fed-
eral regulatory crimes and the corollary ascendancy of federal
criminal law, both premised on liberal invocation of commerce-
based jurisdiction.'4
A line of Supreme Court decisions that clung to the "horse-
and-buggy definition of interstate commerce" slowed the growth of
commerce-based jurisdiction." But once the Court committed itself
to "a practical conception of the commerce power,"' 6 commerce-
based jurisdiction became so commonplace that judicial review was
regarded as "largely a formality."' 7 Indeed, the Supreme Court's
modem Commerce Clause jurisprudence could be read as recogniz-
ing the Commerce Clause as "a complete grant of power."' 8
The Court abruptly departed from that mode in United States
v. Lopez, 9 where for the first time in nearly sixty years it invali-
dated a statute as an unconstitutional exercise of the commerce
power. Notably, the Court accomplished this feat without expressly
overruling any Commerce Clause precedent. This Article is a quest
for the meaning of Lopez. In pursuit of that end, the Article ex-
plores the anomalies of Lopez, its potential impact on the now
substantial body of federal criminal law,"a and its possible reper-
13. The interstate shipment of diseased livestock by rail, for example, could rapidly
transform an isolated phenomenon into a national epidemic. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 116 (1994).
14. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Crimi-
nal Law, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 1135, 1137-45 (1995) [hereinafter Brickey, Criminal Mischiej].
15. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Press conference in response to Supreme Court decisions
overturning New Deal legislation (May 31, 1935), in 4 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND AD-
DRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 200, 221 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938).
16. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1636 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
17. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrtTIONAL LAW § 5-8, at 316 (2d ed.
1988).
18. RONALD ROTUNDA & JOHN NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUIONAL LAW: SUB-
STANE AND PROCEDURE § 4.8, at 394 (2d ed. 1992). Indeed, the Supreme Court has
stated on several occasions that the commerce power is plenary. See, e.g., Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min-
ing & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 114 (1941); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824). The Court in
Lopez countered that "[t]he Constitution [withholds] from Congress a plenary police power
that would authorize enactment of every type of legislation." United States v. Lopez, 115
S. Ct. 1624, 1633 (1995).
19. 115 S. CL 1624 (1995).
20. Today there are more than 3,000 federal crimes on the books. W. John Moore,
The High Price of Good Intentions, 25 NAT'L J. 1140, 1140 (1993). According to a Li-
brary of Congress study, as many as 1,600 of these crimes may have been enacted since
the early 1980s. Press Conference with Representative Don Edwards (D-CA) and J. Mi-
chael Quinlan, Former Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, FED. NEWS SERVICE,
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cussions in Congress-the driving force behind the move to feder-
alize crime.
LOPEZ IN A NUTSHELL
Alphonso Lopez was an unlikely candidate to become a feder-
al cause c6lbre. He was a twelfth-grade student at Edison High
School in San Antonio. His name became a household word only
because he carried a concealed handgun to school one day. Acting
on an anonymous tip, school officials confronted him, and he ad-
mitted he had the gun.2 He was then arrested and charged under
Texas law with possessing a gun on school premises.' The next
day his odyssey to fame began when the state charges were
dropped and he was charged in federal court23 with violating the
Nov. 1, 1993. In stark contrast, the entire body of federal criminal law consisted of 17
crimes in 1790. DwIGHT F. HENDERSON, CONGRESS, COURTS, AND CRIMINALS: THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 1801-1829, at 7 (1985).
21. He explained that "Gilbert" had given him the gun to deliver to "Jason" after
school for use in a "gang war." United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir.
1993).
22. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.03(a) (West 1994) makes it a felony to possess a
firearm or other prohibited weapon on school premises or in a school passenger transpor-
tation vehicle, at a polling place during an election, in a court or court offices, at a race-
track, or in a secured area of an airport.
23. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626. Although successive federal and state prosecutions for
the same conduct do not violate the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy,
Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 194-95 (1959), successive prosecutions could
implicate statutory double jeopardy bars under federal or state law. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 660 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 12.20.010 (1990); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-114 (Michie
1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 656 (West 1992); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1-303 (1990);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 209 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-8 (1992); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 701-112 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, 5/3-4 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-41-4-5 (Bums 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3108 (1988); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 505.050 (Baldwin 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-504 (1986); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:1-11 (West 1982); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 111 (1983); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-1-404 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-294 (Michie 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 939.71 (West 1982). See generally Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Dual Prosecu-
tions: A Model for Concurrent Federal Jurisdiction, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. So. 72 (1996) (endorsing the Petite Policy as a model for limiting the exercise of
federal criminal jurisdiction).
Successive state and federal prosecutions could also implicate the federal Petite Poli-
cy. See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 531 (1960). Under the Petite Policy, a
federal prosecution will normally not be instituted after a state prosecution for the same
conduct unless the federal prosecution would serve "compelling interests of federal law
enforcement." Thompson v. United States, 444 U.S. 248, 248 (1980). The current version
of the Petite Policy is set forth in U.S. DEP'T OF JusTiCE, 3(a) UNrrED STATES
ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.142, at 19 (1988).
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Gun-Free School Zones Act.24
Lopez was convicted of the federal charge?' On appeal, he
challenged the Act as an impermissible exercise of Commerce
Clause jurisdiction. The case reached the Supreme Court after the
Fifth Circuit held that Congress had indeed exceeded its authority
under the Commerce Clause.'s A divided high Court agreed.'
Since the Act purported neither to regulate the use of the
channels of interstate commerce' nor to protect persons or things
The federal civil rights prosecution of four Los Angeles police officers following
their acquittal on state charges in the Rodney King case sparked renewed debate about
whether and how to reform the dual sovereignty doctrine. For a sampling of views on
this subject, see generally Akhil R. Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law
After Rodney King, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (1995), Paul G. Cassell, The Rodney King
Trials and the Double Jeopardy Clause: Some Observations on Original Meaning and the
ACLU's Schizophrenic Views of the Dual Sovereign Doctrine, 41 UCLA L. REv. 693
(1994), Susan N. Herman, Double Jeopardy All Over Again: Dual Sovereignty, Rodney
King, and the ACLU, 41 UCLA L. REV. 609 (1994), Paul Hoffman, Double Jeopardy
Wars: The Case for a Civil Rights "Exception," 41 UCLA L. REv. 649 (1994), and
Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State and Federal Civil Rights Prosecutions: The
Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41 UCLA L. REV. 509 (1994).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994). The decision to make this a federal case is curious.
While it is not unusual in some districts for federal prosecutors to assert jurisdiction over
crimes that are customarily tried in state court, their reason for doing so is typically to
capitalize on the availability of harsher federal penalties, including mandatory minimum
prison terms. See Brickey, Criminal Mischief, supra note 14, at 1159 & nn.138-39, 1165
(discussing Mayor Giuliani's federal day initiative in New York City, Senator Biden's
effort to create a national federal day, and the Justice Department's effort to use federal
firearms laws against violent offenders). But the decision to prosecute Lopez under the
Gun-Free School Zones Act resulted in charging him under a statute that had no manda-
tory minimum sentence and that authorized a shorter maximum prison term and smaller
fine than was authorized under Texas law, which imposed a mandatory minimum prison
term. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(q), 924(a)(4) (1994) with TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 46.03(a) & (f), 12.34 (West 1994).
The decision is all the more curious because Lopez had neither a prior criminal
record nor a disciplinary record at Edison High. Brief for Respondent at 3, United States
v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (No. 93-1260) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief]. Lopez
told a police officer that the reason Gilbert had selected him to deliver the gun was
because Lopez was a good student who rarely got into trouble. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at
1345; Respondent's Brief, supra, at 3. Indeed, Lopez had been accepted by the Marine
Corps under a delayed entry program, and at his sentencing hearing the recruiter testified
that Lopez had the qualities to make a good marine. Joseph Calve, Anatomy of a Land-
mark, TEE. LAW., July 31, 1995, at 1.
25. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), affid, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995).
26. Id.
27. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995).
28. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62
(1964) (upholding civil rights legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in local restau-
rants and motels).
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in commerce,29 it could be upheld under the Commerce Clause
only if it regulated activities that "substantially affect" interstate
commerce. 0 The Court found the Act constitutionally deficient in
several respects. First, it had nothing to do with commerce or any
commercial enterprise.31 Second, it did not contain a jurisdictional
element to ensure that the regulated conduct affects commerce.32
And last, Congress provided neither legislative findings nor legisla-
tive history that spelled out how the prohibited activity affects
commerce.
33
COMMERCIAL OR ECONOMIC Acivrry
The Court found the Act flawed as an exercise of the com-
merce power because gun possession in or near schools is unrelat-
ed to commerce or commercial activity. Although the Court ini-
tially characterized the problem as that of an effort to regulate
purely intrastate activities that are not commercial, when the Court
returned to this theme it referred to case law upholding statutes
that regulate intrastate economic activity. 34 "Where economic ac-
tivity substantially affects interstate commerce," the Court wrote,
"legislation regulating that activity will be sustained. 35
29. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (citing as examples 18
U.S.C. § 32 (destruction of an aircraft) and 18 U.S.C. § 659 (theft from interstate ship-
ments)); Houston, E. & W.T.R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (upholding
application of amendments to Safety Appliance Act to intrastate railroads that compete
with interstate railroads).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 122-23 (1941) (upholding the Fair
Labor Standards Act that, in this context, regulated the working conditions of employees
whose work-related activity was primarily intrastate).
31. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
32. Id. at 1631. As a criminal statute, the Gun-Free School Zones Act had nothing to
do with regulating the channels of commerce or prohibiting the interstate transportation of
something through channels of commerce. Nor did it purport to protect instrumentalities of
interstate commerce or things in commerce. Id. at 1630-31.
33. Id. at 1630-32.
34. Although the Court does not expressly articulate the distinction between commercial
and economic activity, the Court's usage suggests the following. Commercial activity is
monetary activity. It occurs during the course of conducting a trade or business or other-
wise seeking monetary gain. Economic activity is activity that, while not necessarily mer-
cantile, has monetary consequences. It has (or is likely to have) a financial impact on
another party and, when repeated by others, on the economy. This distinction is explored
more fully below. See infra notes 35-64 and accompanying text.
35. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
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This shift in terminology from "commercial" to "economic"
activity occurred first in Wickard v. Filburn.36 Wickard upheld a
provision in the Agricultural Adjustment Act limiting the amount
of wheat that farmers could grow. The Court held that even though
a farmer's production of wheat for home consumption was a purely
local activity, it nonetheless substantially affected interstate com-
merce. Because Wickard's excess wheat was never intended to
enter the stream of commerce, his act of producing it was not
"commercial" activity.37 It was nonetheless "economic" activity in
the sense that it fulfilled his individual need for wheat. If Wickard
had not grown the excess wheat, he would have bought it in the
open market. 8 Thus, his local production of wheat for home con-
sumption influenced price and market conditions.39 In conse-
quence, Congress could regulate Wickard's production of wheat
because that endeavor-though not commercial-had a "substantial
economic effect" on commerce.'
Unlike Wickard's production of excess wheat, Lopez's gun
possession in a school zone was not, in the Court's view, "an
essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity."41 Thus,
the Gun-Free School Zones Act was not within the ambit of prior
cases upholding the regulation of activities that "arise out of" or
are "connected with" a commercial transaction.42
Notwithstanding the Lopez majority's emphasis on commercial
or economic activity, the Court has never held that Commerce
Clause jurisdiction extends only to commercial or economic actors.
Commerce-based jurisdiction has been extended to noneconomic
activity like possessing a firearm "affecting commerce," for
example.43 That being true, what does Lopez mean when it says
36. 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 128. Although Wickard may have been financially motivated to grow his
own wheat, he did not reap any profit from it. Thus, economic activity encompasses
conduct that is not actuated by a profit-seeking motive.
39. Id. at 127-28.
40. Id. at 125. While now characterizing Wickard as a "far reaching example" of the
breadth of the commerce power, the Lopez Court maintained that "[e]ven Wickard...
involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a school zone does
not." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
41. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 571-75 (1977) (upholding a
statute prohibiting convicted felons from possessing firearms "in commerce or affecting
commerce" as a valid exercise of full congressional power under the Commerce
Clause-the requisite minimal nexus exists if the firearm has been in interstate commerce
80719961
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that gun possession in or near schools does not affect commerce
because it is not commercial or economic activity?"
A year before it decided Lopez, the Court confronted a variant
of this problem in National Organization for Women, Inc. v.
Scheidler In NOW, a civil RICO suit, the National Organization
for Women and two women's health organizations sued members
of a coalition of anti-abortion groups. The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants engaged in a pattern of extortion committed through
arson, fire bombings, and other criminal acts designed to intimidate
abortion clinic employees and women seeking abortions.' To sus-
tain the suit, the plaintiffs had to prove that the protesters conduct-
ed the affairs of an enterprise-here, the coalition of anti-abortion
groups-through a pattern of extortionate activity.4
The issue in NOW was whether a RICO enterprise must have
an economic motive or goal. Partly because of the arguably eco-
nomic nature of other conduct prohibited by RICO' and partly
because of the legislative findings Congress adopted,49 three cir-
cuits had held that the enterprise must have an economic purpose
or goal."0 The Court in NOW disagreed."
at some point in time); see also infra text accompanying notes 70-88.
44. Cf. United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 581 (3d Cir. 1995) (the term "commer-
cial" is "arguably potentially ambiguous").
45. 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
46. Id. at 801-02.
47. Id.
48. In addition to prohibiting conducting an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity, RICO also prohibits investing the proceeds of racketeering activity to
acquire an interest in or to establish or operate an enterprise, and acquiring or maintaining
an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(a)-(c) (1994). Although the investment and acquisition provisions are arguably
more closely aligned with economic activity, the Court in NOW declined to hold that they
required such activity. NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 804.
49. The findings are replete with references to the millions of dollars that organized
crime activities drain from the economy and to organized crime's reliance on syndicated
gambling, loan sharking, theft, fencing stolen property, and drug trafficking as sources of
power. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994) (Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose).
50. See NOW v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 625-30 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that the en-
terprise must have an economic motive-abortion protesters who allegedly have an eco-
nomic effect on commerce do not have the requisite motivation), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798
(1994); United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir.) (stating that the enterprise
must be directed toward an economic goal-activities directed toward controlling local
labor unions promote an economic goal), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974 (1988); United States
v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 55-58 (2d Cir.) (stating that while the enterprise must seek
economic gain, that need not be its overriding motive-political terrorists who promote
their cause through extortion to finance it have an economic goal), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
840, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 917 (1983); United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 59-65
[Vol. 46:801
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RICO requires the same nexus between the enterprise and
commerce as the Commerce Clause requires.52 The enterprise must
either be "engaged" in or "affect" commerce. According to the
Court's dictionary of choice, the word "affect" means "to have a
detrimental influence on-used especially in the phrase affecting
commerce." 3 Thus, an enterprise could have a detrimental effect
on commerce even though it had no profit-seeking motive or
goal.
5 4
Could the abortion protesters "affect" commerce if they were
not conducting the affairs of an economically motivated enterprise?
Their purpose was to shut down the clinics. They allegedly pursued
this objective through intimidation, arson, and other criminal acts.
Although these activities might not financially benefit the protest-
ers, their very purpose was to inflict financial harm. In that sense,
then, the protesters could be said to have some economic motive.
But the NOW Court made clear that motive was wholly unimpor-
tant. Arguments focusing on the economic motive of the enterprise
"overlook[ed] the fact that predicate acts, such as the alleged extor-
tion, may not benefit the protestors financially but still may drain
money from the economy by harming businesses such as the clin-
ics."'
(2d Cir. 1983) (stating that the enterprise must have a financial purpose-political terror-
ists who promote their cause through assassinations, arson, bombings and other violent
crimes do not have the necessary mercenary motive); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d
1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980) (stating that the enterprise must be directed toward an eco-
nomic goal), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
51. NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 801.
52. Id. at 803-04.
53. Id. at 804 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 35 (1969))
(internal quotations omitted). On the Court's selective use of dictionaries, see Clark D.
Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE LJ. 1561, 1590-91, 1614-
16 (1994) (noting differences between Webster's Third New International Dictionary, the
Oxford English Dictionary (Second Edition), and Webster's Second Edition in the search
for the ordinary meaning of the word "enterprise"). See also A. Raymond Randolph, Dic-
tionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 71 (1994); Aaron J. Rynd, Dictionaries and the Interpretation of Words: A Summa-
ry of Difficulties, 29 ALBERTA L. Rv. 712 (1991); Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries
and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1437 (1994). For an example of the
classic battle of the dictionaries, compare Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163,
1170 (1993) (Blackmun, J.) (relying on Webster's Third New International Dictionary)
with id. at 1174 (Souter, J., dissenting) (relying on the Oxford English Dictionary for a
competing view).
54. NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 804.
55. Id. at 805.
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In contrast with the statutory construction concern in NOW,
the Court in Lopez was concerned that the activities governed by
the Gun-Free School Zones Act did not "arise out of' and were
not "connected with" a commercial transaction. 6 But do abortion
protesters who engage in a pattern of intimidation engage in activi-
ties arising out of a commercial transaction? A common-sense
understanding of what commercial transactions are would suggest
not. The protesters were promoting a personal, religious, or politi-
cal cause. Thus, the question must be framed in terms of whether
the protesters' activities were connected with a commercial or
economic enterprise or whether, as in Lopez, their activities had
"nothing to do with ...any sort of economic enterprise. 57
In NOW, the coalition of anti-abortion groups presumably had
no economic purpose." Thus, the only "economic enterprise" with
which the protesters had any conceivable connection was the clin-
ics themselves. But they were connected with the clinics only in
the sense that they objected to medical procedures the clinics per-
formed. They were noncommercial actors whose activities disrupted
commercial enterprises engaged in or affecting interstate com-
merce. 9 Is that the kind of commercial nexus the Lopez majority
had in mind?
Suppose that instead of targeting clinics nationwide, the pro-
testers adopted the more limited goal of killing doctors who per-
form abortions in Florida. Their obvious purpose would be to halt
Florida abortions.' If the assassination strategy were to succeed, it
56. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
57. Id. at 1630-31.
58. See NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 802 (noting the District Court's finding that the activities
were politically, not commercially, motivated).
59. Cf United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 919-20 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that
the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act is a valid exercise of the commerce pow-
er); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 681-84 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the provi-
sion of reproductive health services is commercial activity and that the Freedom of Access
to Clinic Entrances Act, which regulates private conduct that affects commercial entities or
activities, is a valid exercise of the commerce power); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517,
1519-21 (lth Cir. 1995) (finding that the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
regulates commercial activity-but even if the provision of reproductive health services
were not commercial activity, congressional findings support the legislative judgment that
the regulated activity substantially affects commerce); American Life League, Inc. v. Reno,
47 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir.) (finding that the Access Act is a valid exercise of the com-
merce power), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995). Jurisdiction based upon conduct "in or
affecting" commerce is discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 177-86.
60. It must be conceded that since the protesters' purpose would be to dissuade physi-
cians from performing abortions, a corollary objective would be to deprive physicians who
[Vol. 46:801
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too could drain money from the economy by inflicting the same
financial harm envisioned in NOW. 6' Thus, the protest enterprise
would be engaged in activities that adversely "affect" commerce
and would pass muster under NOW. But where is the commercial
activity or economic enterprise that Lopez demands? 62
The majority in Lopez maintained that its decision was consis-
tent with modem Commerce Clause precedent. Indeed, the Court
succeeded in invalidating the Act as an unconstitutional exercise of
the commerce power without overruling a single case. Instead, the
opinion observes that, while some prior Commerce Clause cases
have suggested the possibility of additional expansion of com-
merce-based jurisdiction, the Court now declines to proceed any
further down that road.63 Thus, the majority at least creates the
impression that it is simply maintaining the status quo.
If that is the case, one can only conclude that even though the
majority insisted that intrastate activity must be commercial or
economic, noncommercial activity that adversely affects an eco-
nomic enterprise engaged in commerce is subject to Commerce
Clause jurisdiction.'
perform the procedure of their livelihood.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 45-55 (discussing NOW in greater depth).
62. One might be tempted to attribute this semantic puzzle to stylistic differences
among members of the Court were it not for the irony that Justice Rehnquist wrote both
the majority opinion in Lopez and the unanimous opinion in NOW.
From Justice Souter's perspective, perhaps these questions illustrate the "hopeless
porosity" of the commercial/noncommercial distinction the majority draws. See Lopez, 115
S. Ct. at 1654 (Souter, J., dissenting). In Justice Souter's view, this distinction looks for
all the world like the direct/indirect dichotomy embedded in the "untenable jurisprudence"
that the Court abandoned in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1654. Similarly, Justice Breyer objects that in our complex national
economy, it is "almost impossible" to distinguish commercial from noncommercial activi-
ties. Id. at 1664 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
63. 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 580-81 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding
that Lopez did not create a "bright line" rule requiring that regulated activity be commer-
cial or economic); United States v. Edwards, 894 F. Supp. 340, 342 (E.D. Wis. 1995)
(noting that the regulated activity itself need not be commercial). But see Bishop, 66 F.3d
at 602 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("While it is far from clear
what Lopez meant by a 'commercial transaction,' the preferable definition of commercial
transaction 'requires an activity involving a voluntary economic exchange."); Anne C.
Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1817 (1995) (stating that
Lopez "removed noneconomic local activity-whatever its effect on interstate com-
merce--from the scope of federal regulatory power"). Compare United States v. Sage, 906
F. Supp. 84, 89-90 (D. Conn. 1995) (Nonpayment of child support payments is an eco-
nomic activity in that each payment withheld economically benefits the noncustodial parent
and economically harms the unsupported child; because interstate cases account for an
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CURING JURISDICTIONAL FLAWS
The Lopez Court recognized that the process of determining
whether intrastate activity is commercial or noncommercial is nei-
ther precise nor formulaic.' The extent to which Congress can
regulate a specified activity under the commerce power is necessar-
ily a matter of degree.'
In support of its conclusion that gun possession in a school
zone was not an economic activity, the Court made the following
observations: (1) Lopez was a local student at a San Antonio
school; (2) there was no evidence that he had recently traveled in
interstate commerce; and (3) the Act did not require a showing of
any concrete tie between his gun possession and commerce. 7
These observations suggest several ways in which the jurisdic-
tional flaws in the Act might be cured. One would focus on the
movement of persons or things in interstate commerce. Thus, for
example, Congress could have prohibited crossing state lines with
intent to possess a firearm in a school zone. This is a common
technique for asserting federal criminal jurisdiction. 8 Congress has
invoked the Commerce Clause to prohibit the interstate transporta-
tion of everyone from fugitive felons69  to kidnapping victims,
70
estimated $14 billion in uncollected child support judgments, the Act regulates activity
that substantially affects commerce and hence is a constitutional exercise of the commerce
power.) with United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360, 1363-64 (D. Ariz. 1995) (con-
cluding that collection of delinquent child custody payments from the noncustodial parent
who lives in another state does not involve commercial intercourse-the Child Support
Recovery Act of 1992 is an unconstitutional exercise of the commerce power).
Thus, perhaps Justice Breyer's concern that the majority would apparently distinguish
two local activities that had identical effects on commerce if one were commercial and
the other were not is premature, if not misplaced. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1663-64
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
The question whether noncommercial activity directed at noncommercial entities can
substantially affect commerce is considered below. See infra text accompanying notes 199-
213.
65. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633-34.
66. Id. at 1633.
67. Id. at 1634.
68. The Supreme Court had validated this species of criminal jurisdiction by the turn
of the century. See Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 323 (1913) (upholding the con-
stitutionality of the Mann Act); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 57-58
(1911) (upholding a statute punishing interstate transportation of adulterated articles);
Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 363-64 (1903) (upholding the constitutionality of a
statute suppressing interstate transportation of lottery tickets).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1994) (fleeing across state lines to avoid prosecution).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994) (transporting a kidnapping victim across state lines).
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prostitutes,7 ' sexually exploited children,72 spouse abusers," and
animal enterprise terrorists.74
Admittedly, many statutes employing this approach are direct-
ed at what are normally considered local concerns, and they often
amount to an exercise of concurrent jurisdiction over state
crimes.' The Gun-Free School Zones Act is the quintessential
example. More than forty states, including Texas,76 have statutes
that make possession of a firearm on school grounds a crime.' If
Congress were to correct the jurisdictional flaw in the Gun-Free
71. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2423 (1994) (transporting an individual across state lines to
engage in prostitution or other criminal sexual activity).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (1994) (transporting a minor across state lines for the purpose of
engaging in sexually explicit conduct for visual depiction).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (1994) (travelling interstate with intent to harass, intimidate, or
injure one's spouse or intimate partner).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 43 (1994) (travelling across state lines for the purpose of disrupting
the function of an animal enterprise).
75. The federal government can effectively exercise concurrent jurisdiction by adding
the element of interstate travel to what are otherwise state crimes. Thus, for example, the
Violence Against Women Act asserts federal jurisdiction over domestic violence that re-
suits in bodily injury to a spouse or domestic partner if the assaulter traveled interstate
with the intent to harass, intimidate, or injure the spouse or partner. 18 U.S.C. § 2261
(1994). Thus, assuming the requisite intent and resulting injury, a spouse abuser may be
federally prosecuted for committing crimes like assault, battery, rape, and homicide if he
traveled interstate.
Similarly, the Travel Act federalizes prostitution, extortion, bribery, and arson that is
punishable under state law if the offender traveled interstate with intent to promote or
commit such crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994). The federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2119 (1994), see infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text, is another recent enactment
in which the primary concern is conduct that constitutes a state crime.
Congress sometimes expressly recognizes that it is regulating matters of state concern
by indicating its intent neither to occupy the field nor invalidate state law. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 659 (1994) (theft from common carrier); 18 U.S.C. § 43(e) (1994) (animal en-
terprise terrorism); 18 U.S.C. § 224(b) (1994) (bribery in sporting contests); 18 U.S.C.
§ 233 (1994) (civil disorders); 18 U.S.C. § 248(a) (1994) (freedom of access to clinic
entrances); 18 U.S.C. § 848 (1994) (importation, manufacture, distribution, and storage of
explosive materials); 18 U.S.C. § 896 (1994) (extortionate credit transactions); 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(q)(4) (1994) (gun-free school zones); 18 U.S.C. § 927 (1994) (firearms offenses);
18 U.S.C. § 1074(b) (1994) (flight to avoid prosecution for damaging or destroying prop-
erty); 18 U.S.C. § 1468(c) (1994) (distributing obscene material by cable or subscription
television); 18 U.S.C. § 2345 (1994) (contraband cigarettes).
The Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1870, and 1871 are historical antecedents of modern
statutes that create concurrent federal jurisdiction over state crimes. See Brickey, Criminal
Mischief, supra note 14, at 1139-40 & nn.26-30.
76. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.03(a) (West 1994). The Texas statute is discussed
supra in note 22.
77. Respondent's Brief, supra note 24, at 24 n.20. A compendium of the statutes ap-
pears as Appendix B to the brief. See id. at 3a.
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School Zones Act by requiring that the gun possessor travel in
interstate commerce, the underlying social concern would be pre-
cisely the same as before-the adverse impact of violent crime on
the educational process. But because the Court has recognized that
"[t]ransportation alone across state lines is commerce," '78 it would
be unnecessary to address the question whether gun possession in
school zones affects commerce. As Justice Kennedy's concurrence
observed, "[e]ven the most confined interpretation of 'commerce'
would embrace transportation between the States."'79
Alternatively, Congress could prohibit possessing a firearm in
a school zone if the weapon itself had been transported in com-
merce, regardless of whether its possessor had crossed state lines.
This is another common approach to federalizing local crime.8"
The early statutes that used this approach required a discernible
connection between the underlying crime and movement in com-
merce.8' The Dyer Act, 2 for example, prohibits transporting sto-
len motor vehicles in interstate commerce. 3 In Dyer Act prose-
cutions, the government must prove the vehicle was moved in
commerce after it was stolen. Thus, whether the thief transports a
stolen vehicle or its parts for sale in another state-or simply uses
it for interstate flight-the transportation is factually linked to the
theft.
This is in marked contrast with many modem commerce-based
federal crimes in which the link between commerce and the prohib-
ited activity may be tenuous at best. The federal carjacking statute,
for example, prohibits the forcible taking of any motor vehicle that
78. NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606 (1939) (emphasis added) (citing Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) and Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903)). That
is true whether or not the transportation itself is "commercial." See Heart of Atlanta Mo-
tel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964).
79. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1636 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
80. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 46 (1994) (water hyacinths); 18 U.S.C. § 844(d) (1994) (ex-
plosives); 18 U.S.C. § 924(b) (1994) (firearms); 18 U.S.C. § 1301 (1994) (lottery tickets);
18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1994) (obscene materials); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-2313 (1994) (stolen
motor vehicles); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (1994) (stolen goods and wares); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2318 (1994) (counterfeit phonograph records).
81. For a chronicle of the evolving role of the Commerce Clause in federalized crime,
see Kathleen F. Brickey, The Commerce Clause and Federalized Crime: A Tale of Two
Thieves, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SoC. So. 27 (1996).
82. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-2313 (1994).
83. Id. § 2312. The Act also prohibits receiving, concealing, or disposing of stolen
vehicles that have been transported across state lines. Id. § 2313.
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has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate com-
merce.14 Since virtually all automobiles are transported from one
state to another before they are sold,8" this statute federalizes es-
sentially all armed robberies in which the object of the theft is a
car.86 That is true even though the out-of-state manufacturer's
shipment of the car to the in-state dealer is remote in time and
place and wholly unrelated to the crime.
Congress could have used this approach in the Gun-Free
School Zones Act by prohibiting possession in school zones of
guns that have been "shipped, transported, or received" in interstate
commerce. Suppose the Act had included such language. What if
the gun was manufactured in Massachusetts, shipped to Texas, and
sold to Lopez's father by a San Antonio dealer ten years before
young Lopez was arrested. Does the interstate transportation of the
84. Id. § 2119.
85. But see United States v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947 (8th Cir. 1995). In Johnson, the
court held that an automobile that had been assembled in one state from components
manufactured in another had not been "transported, shipped, or received" in interstate
commerce. While it "would require no great leap in logic and likely would not offend the
Commerce Clause" to make theft of such cars a federal crime, Congress did not draft the
statute that broadly. Id. at 957.
86. See United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 106, 107 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding interstate
commerce nexus is satisfied when a car that was manufactured in Smyrna, Tennessee and
shipped to a Chattanooga, Tennessee dealer passed through Georgia en route).
Anecdotal evidence derived from the facts of reported cases suggests that the over-
whelming majority of federal carjacking prosecutions involve purely intrastate robberies.
See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Robinson,
62 F.3d 234 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Murray, No. 94-10124, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 11610 (9th Cir. May 11, 1995)
(reported in case table format at 56 F.3d 74), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 261 (1995); United
States v. Hudson, 53 F.3d 744 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 235, and cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 400 (1995); United States v. Woosley, No. 94-6137, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
14931 (6th Cir. June 14, 1995) (reported in case table format at 57 F.3d 1072), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 349 (1995); United States v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947 (8th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Perez-Garcia, 56 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 400 (1995);
United States v. T.F.F., A Juvenile Male, 55 F.3d 1118 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Fuentes-Vazquez, 52 F.3d 394 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 135 (5th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Singleton, 49 F.3d 129 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 324 (1995); United States v. Bell, 46 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Clark, 45 F.3d 1247 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Overstreet, 40 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1970 (1995); United States v. A.R., A Male Juvenile, 38
F.3d 699 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Harris, 25 F.3d 1275 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 458 (1994); United States v. Mohammed 27 F.3d 815 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 451 (1994); United States v. Robertson, 21 F.3d 1030 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 238 (1994) and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 197 (1995). But see United States v.
Johnson, 32 F.3d 82 (4th Cir.) (interstate crime), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 650 (1994).
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gun a decade before he possessed it in school fulfill the jurisdic-
tional requirements imposed by the Court? Does it supply a con-
crete connection between his possession and commerce?
Although one could argue that because the possession is so
remote from the transportation the connection is too tenuous, 7 un-
der settled case law the jurisdictional element is satisfied if the gun
had previously traveled interstate88 or was manufactured out of
state. 9 The government is not required to prove that the posses-
sion itself was "part of the interstate movement."" The jurisdic-
tional language denotes a completed act.9 Thus, "[ilt is the move-
ment of the firearm" that affects commerce, "not the activity of the
person in whose possession it is later found.""
Because the statute may be applied "with little concern for
when the nexus with commerce occurred,"93 the gun may come to
87. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (noting that there was no evidence that Lopez had
"recently" traveled in interstate commerce).
88. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350 (1971); see also United States v. John-
son, 22 F.3d 106, 109 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Horton, 503 F.2d 810, 813 (7th
Cir. 1974); United States v. Haley, 500 F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Bush, 500 F.2d 19, 21 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Rollings, 494 F.2d 344, 345 (8th
Cir. 1974); United States v. Lupino, 480 F.2d 720, 723-24 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 924 (1973); United States v. Mullins, 476 F.2d 664, 664 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 839 (1973); United States v. Brown, 472 F.2d 1181, 1182 (6th Cir. 1973).
89. United States v. Cole, CRIM. No. 89-322, CIV.A. No. 95-3190, 1995 WL 375833
at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (noting that the burden can be met by showing that the firearm
was manufactured in another state); United States v. Johnson, 722 F.2d 407, 410 (8th Cir.
1983) (noting that proof of manufacture in another state is sufficient); see also United
States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732, 1733 (1995) (per curiam) (holding that the opera-
tion of a gold mine in Alaska constituted production, distribution, or acquisition of goods
in interstate commerce); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 308 (1969) (holding that the pad-
dle boats, jukebox, and records at an Arkansas amusement park moved in interstate com-
merce).
90. Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 216 (1976). Stated differently, the defendant
need not travel interstate while possessing the gun.
91.
Thus, there is no warping or stretching of language when the statute is applied
to a firearm that already has completed its interstate journey and has come to
rest in the dealer's showcase at the time of its purchase and receipt by the
felon.
Id. at 217.
92. United States v. Bumphus, 508 F.2d 1405, 1407 (10th Cir. 1975); cf. United States
v. Walker, 489 F.2d 1353, 1357-58 (7th Cir. 1973) (finding that the possession of a
firearm that has previously moved in commerce satisfies the jurisdictional element even
though the possession is unrelated to the prior movement in commerce), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 982 (1974).
93. Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 577 (1977) (emphasis added); cf
United States v. Thomas, 485 F.2d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that the jurisdiction-
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rest in the dealer's display case 9 4-- or in the Lopez household for
that matter-and still supply the requisite link to commerce.95 The
jurisdictional element would be satisfied by "the minimal nexus
that the firearm [has] been, at some time, in interstate com-
merce,"96 regardless of when the movement occurred.97 If the
mere movement of the gun in interstate commerce confers jurisdic-
tion, and if the possession need not be related to the movement, it
would seem that Congress can regulate gun possession wherever it
occurs-including school zones-provided that it employs the right
jurisdictional hook.98
A PATH LESS CERTAIN
The Court in Lopez briefly addressed the extent to which
regulated activity must affect commerce. Noting that its past Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence had left unclear whether the activity
must "affect" or "substantially affect" commerce, the Court found
that the weight of authority supported the "substantially affects"
al element is satisfied if the firearm has previously moved in commerce, and there is no
limit on the amount of time that can elapse between the interstate transportation and the
possession).
94. Barrett, 423 U.S. at 217; cf. Walker, 489 F.2d at 1354 (finding that a gun that
was shipped from Florida to Illinois, sold six months later by an Illinois retailer to a
pawnbroker, and resold to a third party provided a sufficient nexus with commerce);
Thomas, 485 F.2d at 557 (finding a sufficient link with commerce where a Florida im-
porter who sold a gun manufactured in Germany to a Florida gun distributor, who sold it
to a pawn shop, which sold it to a third party, who then sold it back to the pawn shop,
which then sold it to the defendant); United States v. Lupino, 480 F.2d 720, 723 (8th
Cir.) (finding a sufficient link with commerce where a gun manufactured in Germany that
was shipped to New York and ultimately entered customs in Minnesota where the defen-
dant acquired it), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924 (1973).
95. See United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 106, 109 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding that the
carijacking statute does not require a car to be in commerce when it is stolen if the car
has previously moved in commerce).
96. Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 575 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 577.
98. Cf. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Congress' power to regu-
late commerce in firearms includes the power to prohibit possession of guns at any loca-
tion because of their potentially harmful use.").
Legislation to resuscitate the Gun-Free School Zones Act is presently pending. The
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1995 would make the possession of a firearm in or near a
school a federal crime if the gun had previously moved in commerce or otherwise affect-
ed commerce. H.R. 1608, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 890, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).
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standard.99 While the Court has indeed used the substantially af-
fects standard in some of its past Commerce Clause decisions,"
the Court has never explained just what it means. In view of the
Lopez Court's disdain for the speculative interstate connections
posited by the government' * and Justice Breyer's dissent, at min-
imum, a substantial relation to commerce must be a real connec-
tion, not an imagined one. But beyond that, it is difficult to gauge,
particularly in light of language the Court has used in past deci-
sions.
While the term "substantial" could connote that the activity
must have a significant or important effect on commerce, *°2 lan-
guage in some of the Court's earlier decisions connotes a contrast-
ing view. In National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt,ir3 for
example, the Court confronted a challenge to the National Labor
Relations Act, which, as applied to the facts, regulated the working
conditions of employees engaged in purely intrastate activity. '04
The Court observed that when Congress acts under the com-
merce power, it can choose to regulate activities that affect either a
large or small volume of commerce. In Fainblatt, the volume of
commerce affected, "though substantial," was "relatively small."'' 5
But the Act does not require that the regulated activity affect a
particular volume of commerce beyond the threshold level of a
99. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. The Court cited only Jones & Laughlin Steel and Wirtz
in support of its conclusion. Id. at 1629-30.
100. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296-97 (1964) (finding that racial
discrimination by a restaurant that buys meat produced out of state substantially affects
interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255,
258 (1964) (finding that racial discrimination in public accommodations substantially af-
fects interstate commerce); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118,
119 (1942) (finding that milk produced intrastate that competes with milk produced out of
state substantially affects interstate commerce); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 106,
119-20 (1941) (finding that the intrastate production of lumber and the employment of
workmen in production substantially affect interstate commerce).
101. See infra text accompanying notes 156-64.
102. Ironically, Justice Breyer, who believed that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was a
constitutional exercise of commerce power, would adopt a "significant effect" test. Lopez,
115 S. Ct. at 1657 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
103. 306 U.S. 601 (1939).
104. Id. at 602.
105. Id. at 606. Similarly, the Court in Darby declared that Congress can regulate intra-
state activities having a substantial effect on commerce, but that no particular volume or
amount of commerce need be involved. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119-20,
123 (1941).
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"de minimis" effect. '06 Stated differently, as long as an activity's
effect on commerce is more than trifling (or, in Wickard's terms,
trivial),'" Congress has power to regulate it. In Fainblatt, the
regular interstate shipment of products produced by a small manu-
facturing company satisfied that threshold.'
Later in Scarborough v. United States,'" the Court upheld a
statute prohibiting convicted felons from possessing guns "in com-
merce or affecting commerce."". The defendant claimed that, be-
cause there was no commerce connection contemporaneous with his
possession, there was no jurisdictional ground for his conviction.
The Court disagreed. By regulating possession "in" and "affecting"
commerce, Congress clearly intended to bar more than possession
in commerce or in interstate facilities."' "Congress sought to
reach possessions broadly," regardless of when the commerce con-
nection occurred."' The Court could find "no indication that Con-
gress intended to require any more than the minimal nexus that the
firearm have been, at some time, in interstate commerce.""'
106. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. at 607.
107. In Wickard, the Court declared that while Wickard's individual "contribution to the
demand for wheat may be trivial by itself," his production of wheat for home consump-
tion was nonetheless subject to federal regulation if "his contribution, taken together with
that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial." Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28
(citing Fainblatt, 306 U.S. at 606, et seq. and Darby, 312 U.S. at 123).
The Court echoed these sentiments in Wirtz. "The contention that in Commerce
Clause cases the courts have power to excise, as trivial, individual instances falling within
a rationally defined class of activities has been put entirely to rest." Maryland v. Wirtz,
392 U.S. 183, 192-93 (1968) (citing Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28, Polish Nat'l Alliance
v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301
(1964)), overruled by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
Lopez revived this theme when it stated that the Court has "never declared that
'Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general
regulation of state or private activities."' Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630 (quoting Wirtz, 392
U.S. at 196 n.27).
108. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. at 606. In view of the Court's post-Lopez decision in United
States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732 (1995) (per curiam), Fainblatt would likely be recast
as a case in which the company was "engaged in commerce," thus obviating any need to
determine what effect its activities had on commerce. See infra text accompanying notes
187-96 (discussing Robertson).
109. 431 U.S. 563 (1977).
110. Id. at 564. The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the validity of the statute after Lopez in
United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 400 (10th Cir. 1995).
111. Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 572. The legislative history supported this conclusion. Id.
at 572-75.
112. Id. at 577.
113. Id. at 575 (emphasis added).
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Another of the Court's decisions has led to rampant use of the
terms "minimal" and "de minimis" to describe the requisite connec-
tion with commerce.' 14 That is not so much because of the
breadth of the Court's language as it is the breadth of the statute it
upheld. Stirone v. United States"5 involved a challenge to the
Hobbs Act, which prohibits obstructing, delaying, or affecting
commerce in "any way or degree" through the commission of
robbery, extortion, or acts of violence."6 Stirone was convicted of
obstructing commerce by threatening labor disputes that could have
prevented a maker of ready-mixed concrete from fulfilling a con-
tract to supply concrete for a construction project. Although the
construction project was in-state, the concrete maker obtained his
sand from out of state. The Court found that his dependence on
out-of-state sand supplied a sufficient nexus with interstate com-
merce to confer Hobbs Act jurisdiction. If the extortion had
harmed or destroyed his business, shipments of sand to him would
have diminished or ceased, and that is precisely the kind of com-
mercial harm the Hobbs Act was intended to curb." 7
Courts considering the breadth of the Hobbs Act after Stirone
have variously described the requisite impact on commerce as "de
minimis, '.. "minimal,"' 19  "slight,"'2 °  or "small."'' Hobbs
114. See infra notes 118-31 and accompanying text.
115. 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1994). The "affecting commerce" language ordinarily mani-
fests congressional intent to use full Commerce Clause power. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co.
v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 839 (1995) (citing Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858,
859 (1985)).
117. Stirone, 361 U.S. at 215.
118. See, e.g., United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 558 (7th Cir.) (post-Lopez), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 383 (1995); United States v. Woodruff, 50 F.3d 673, 676 (9th Cir.
1995); United States v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95, 99 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1986 (1995); United States v. Davis, 30 F.3d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 769 (1995); United States v. Zeigler, 19 F.3d 486, 489 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 517 (1994); United States v. Shields, 999 F.2d 1090, 1098 (7th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 877 (1994); United States v. McKenna, 889 F.2d 1168, 1171-72
(1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 862 (1988); see also United States v. Shively, 927 F.2d 804, 808 (5th Cir.)
(stating that the arson statute should be read broadly to reach activities having even a de
minimis effect on commerce), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1209 (1991); United States v. Voss,
787 F.2d 393, 397 (8th Cir.) (stating that under the federal arson statute, Congress in-
tended to reach arson of any property used in an activity having a de minimis relation to
commerce), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 888 (1986); United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84,
89 (D. Conn. 1995) (stating that the de minimis character of an individual instance of
withholding child support is irrelevant under the Child Support Recovery Act if the regu-
lated activity, when considered in the aggregate, substantially affects commerce); United
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Act decisions handed down after Lopez reflect continued semantic
confusion. Citing intra-circuit precedent (but not Lopez), one opin-
ion states that under the Hobbs Act, the effect on commerce may
be "de minimis" or "minimal."'" Another, also relying exclusive-
ly on intra-circuit precedent, states that the Hobbs Act applies
when there is an impact on commerce, "however small," or where
the connection with commerce is even "slight."'" Yet another
states that Lopez did not change the "minimal potential effect"
standard under the Hobbs Act. 24
Construing an identical jurisdictional element in a different
context,"ss another post-Lopez opinion stated that a minimal effect
is sufficient to establish jurisdiction."2 Citing Lopez for the prem-
ise that the effect cannot be too indirect and remote, 27 the court
States v. Payne, 841 F. Supp. 810, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (stating that the carjacking need
only have a de minimis effect on interstate commerce to give Congress authority to regu-
late it), affd, 59 F.3d 171 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 347 (1995).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 30 F.3d 276, 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 602 (1994); United States v. Davis, 967 F.2d 516, 522 (11th Cir. 1992); see also
United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Scarborough v. United
States, 431 U.S. 563, 575 (1977) (the firearms possession statute requires only the mini-
mal nexus that the firearm was in commerce at some time)).
120. See, e.g., Stillo, 57 F.3d at 558; United States v. Box, 50 F.3d 345, 352 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 309 (1995); United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1382
(5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 929 (1994); United States v. Inigo, 925 F.2d 641, 648 (3d Cir. 1991); see
also United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that the machine
gun possession statute's requirement of a "tenuous nexus" is sufficient).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 990 F.2d 119, 125 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing United
States v. Brentley, 777 F.2d 159, 162 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822 (1986));
United States v. Taylor, 966 F.2d 830, 836 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 249
(1993).
122. United States v. Frost, 61 F.3d 1518, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (stating
that extorting a city council member to resign his seat affected interstate commerce in at
least a minimal degree); see also United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 399-400 (10th
Cir. 1995) (noting that evidence that money the defendant obtained in robberies would
have been used to purchase items in interstate commerce was sufficient to establish a de
minimis effect on commerce).
123. United States v. Huynh, 60 F.3d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (finding
that threats to prevent the mailing of Social Security checks across state lines affected
interstate commerce).
124. United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 558 n.2 (7th Cir.) (stating that the Hobbs
Act's express jurisdictional requirement distinguishes it from the Gun-Free School Zones
Act), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 383 (1995); see also United States v. Arena, 894 F. Supp.
580, 584-85 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that Lopez does not affect the Hobbs Act).
125. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4) (1994) (money laundering).
126. United States v. Grey, 56 F.3d 1219, 1224 (10th Cir. 1995).
127. Id. at 1225-26 n.3. Justices Souter and Breyer expressed concern that the Court's
emphasis on commercial versus noncommercial activity signaled a return to the long-dis-
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emphasized that the minimal impact standard still requires the
government to prove the manner or degree in which the activity
affects commerce."
Lopez leaves us in a semantic quagmire. If Stirone is still
good law, Congress has power to regulate activity that affects
commerce in any way or degree. But "any" is not the same as
"substantial." The "affecting commerce" language signals congres-
sional intent to exercise full power under the Commerce
Clause.129 By invoking the full extent of its power in the Hobbs
Act, Congress did not say-as it could have said-that the Act
only outlaws extortion that obstructs commerce to a great (i.e.,
substantial) extent.' It said the Hobbs Act forbids extortion that
obstructs commerce in any way or degree, no matter how great or
small.
But the force of this analysis is undercut by courts' uncritical
use of terms like "substantial," "de minimis," "minimal" and
"small." Courts indiscriminately use these words "to express differ-
ent and sometimes contradictory ideas,"'' thus robbing them of
any true significance. Hence, the "substantially affects commerce"
test-though clothed in the garb of substantive rule-may be little
more than linguistic formality.
carded directlindirect distinction. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1654 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at
1663 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The court in Grey contributed to the revival of that test. See
Grey, 56 F.3d at 1225; see also United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 526 (9th
Cir. 1995) (noting that Lopez clearly requires that the regulated activity's effect on com-
merce must not be too indirect and remote).
128. "'Minimal' is defined as 'of, being, or having the character of a minimum.'
'Minimum' means 'the least quantity assignable, admissible, or possible in a given
case.' . . . Without delving into metaphysics, we can suggest at least that something is
more than nothing." Grey, 56 F.3d at 1225 (quoting Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, Unabridged (1968) and concluding that the government had failed to prove
even a minimal effect on commerce); cf. United State v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 390
(11th Cir. 1996) ("Nothing in Lopez suggests that the 'minimal nexus' test should be
changed.").
129. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960).
130. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1994) (federal civil rights act protecting against injur-
ing or intimidating anyone engaged in a business that sells a substantial portion of its
articles or services to interstate travelers or that moves a substantial portion of its articles
in interstate commerce).
131. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 68 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring).
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LEGISLATIVE FACT-FINDING
To cure the jurisdictional flaw in the Gun-Free School Zones
Act, Congress could have made formal findings that provided an
explicit link between gun possession in school zones and interstate
commerce. Congress often employs this legislative technique when
enacting legislation that regulates activity previously considered to
be purely intrastate." A finding that links large-scale gam-
bling enterprises.. or loan sharking 34 to interstate commerce,
for example, speaks to the effect of these undertakings on com-
merce as a class of activities. If the class of activities as a whole
affects commerce, then an individual instance of the activity need
not be shown to do so. 35 In consequence, the finding serves as a
proxy for an express jurisdictional element.
Thus, for example, congressional findings that illegal gambling
operations extensively affect interstate commerce'36 can be substi-
tuted for a jurisdictional element that would require the government
to prove an interstate nexus on a case-by-case basis. Hence, substi-
tution of legislative findings for an express jurisdictional element
serves to rescue prosecutions that would have foundered on the
government's inability to prove that a particular defendant transmit-
ted wagering information interstate, or that specific gambling pro-
ceeds or paraphernalia had moved interstate.'" And because find-
ings relieve the government of having to prove even a minimal
connection between the gambling activity and commerce, they
increase the likelihood of federal prosecutions based on wholly
intrastate activity.'
132. Legislative findings can appear in the United States Code either in the form of a
statute, see, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1994) (controlled substances), or as a separate declara-
tion printed in explanatory material following a statute. See, e.g., id. § 891 (extortionate
credit transactions); id. § 921 (gun possession); id. § 1961 (RICO). Findings may also be
incorporated in committee reports explaining proposed legislation. See, e.g., SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 617,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1969).
133. See S. REP. No. 617, supra note 132, at 73.
134. See 18 U.S.C. § 891 (1994) (Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purpose).
135. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 152 (1971); cf. United States v. Women's
Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949) ("If it is interstate commerce that feels
the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze.").
136. See S. REP. No. 617, supra note 132, at 73 (noting that illegal gambling opera-
tions depend on the facilities of interstate commerce, and that illegal gambling proceeds
and paraphernalia often move in interstate commerce).
137. Id. at 72.
138. Cf. Perez, 402 U.S. at 157 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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When Congress enacted the Gun-Free School Zones Act, it
did not adopt any formal findings. Under the rational basis analysis
applicable to Commerce Clause cases,'39 however, the Court has
never required Congress to "articulate its reasons for enacting a
statute."'" When Congress adopts findings, courts give them sub-
stantial deference, thus simplifying the judicial task of assessing the
reasonableness of the legislative judgment that the class of regulat-
ed activities affects commerce. 4'
As a general rule, the absence of "'legislative facts on the
record"' does not render a statute constitutionally suspect. 42 In
the ordinary course of events, judicial inquiry into the rationality of
a statute is limited to "the issue whether any state of facts either
known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for
it."' 43 Although the Court in Lopez reaffirmed that Congress is
not usually required to make formal findings on the relationship
between the regulated activity and interstate commerce,' it also
observed that when the relationship is not obvious-as it was not
[U]nder the statute before us a man can be convicted without any proof of
interstate movement, of the use of the facilities of interstate commerce, or of
facts showing that his conduct affected interstate commerce. I think the Framers
of the Constitution never intended that the National Government might define
as a crime and prosecute such wholly local activity through the enactment of
federal criminal laws.
Id.
139. The Court customarily defers to Congress under the Commerce Clause if the Court
finds that there was a rational basis for concluding that the regulated activity affects com-
merce and that the regulatory means are reasonably suited to the stated ends. See, e.g.,
Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclana-
tion Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 190 (1968),
overruled by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258-59 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964).
140. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2102 (1993); cf EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243-44 n.18 (1983) (noting that Congress need not expressly
state what power it is exercising); Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 299 (noting that "no formal
findings were made, which of course are not necessary"); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co.,
333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948) ('qhe question of the constitutionality of action taken by Con-
gress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise.").
By articulating its reasons for acting via formal legislative findings, Congress states
its basis for concluding that the regulated activity is an appropriate subject of federal
jurisdiction.
141. See United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 295 (9th Cir. 1993), vacated on other
grounds, 115 S. Ct. 1819 (1995).
142. See Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. at 2102.
143. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938).
144. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
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to the Lopez majority-legislative findings can assist the Court in
evaluating the congressional judgment that a substantial relationship
exists.45
The government urged that, because Congress had, on many
prior occasions, included specific findings in firearms legisla-
tion," its "accumulated institutional expertise" obviated the need
for new findings."47 But the Court viewed reliance on findings in
predecessor statutes as inappropriate in the context of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act because neither the findings nor the laws they
support address gun possession in school zones or the relationship
between that activity and commerce."4 Instead, the Act "'plows
thoroughly new ground and represents a sharp break with the long-
standing pattern of federal firearms legislation.""'49
While most of the earlier firearms laws included a commerce-
based jurisdictional element or findings that articulated a nexus
between the regulated activity and commerce, 50 their findings and
legislative history strongly suggest that firearms move freely in
commerce, and that the ease with which juveniles can obtain fire-
arms contributes to the prevalence of violent crime in general, and
of juvenile crime in particular."' Assuming arguendo these find-
ings provide a rational basis for concluding that possession of
firearms affects commerce and that Congress has the power to
145. Id. at 1632.
146. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1348-60 (surveying the substance and legislative histories of
the National Firearms Act of 1934, the Federal Firearms Act of 1938, the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, The Gun Control Act of 1968, the Firearms Own-
ers Protection Act of 1986, the Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988, the Anti-Drug Abuse
Amendments Act of 1988, the Crime Control Act of 1990, and the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990).
147. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632. As Justice Powell once observed, when Congress has
"legislated repeatedly in an area of national concern," its familiarity with the field may
diminish the need for "fresh hearings or prolonged debate" when Congress revisits the
issue. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 503 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
148. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
149. Id. at 1632 (quoting Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1366).
150. But see 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1994) (banning transfer or possession of machine
guns). This section, which forbids mere possession, was enacted with scant legislative
history and no committee report. See Farmer v. Higgins, 907 F.2d 1041, 1044-45 (11th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1047 (1991). The Eighth and Ninth Circuits upheld the
constitutionality of § 922 in the pre-Lopez decisions of United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d
1016, 1018 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1614 (1993), and United States v.
Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991). The Fifth Circuit upheld the statute in a post-
Lopez decision. See United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1995) reh'g en banc
granted, 78 F.3d 160 (1996).
151. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1350 & n. 17 (citing Pub. L. No. 90-351 § 901(a)).
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regulate possession,"' would it be logical to conclude that gun
possession "ceases to affect commerce" when it occurs in a school
zone?'53 Or would it be more logical to conclude that Congress
has determined that gun possession in school zones creates more
serious risks than it does in other places, and thus punished it
more harshly?'54 If so, does the statute incorporate a reasonable
way of decreasing the availability of guns to children and reducing
the incidence of school violence?'55 Or is this even a permissible
congressional goal?
THE GOVERNMENT'S CASE
The government reasoned that gun possession in school zones
may lead to violent crime, which in turn adversely affects the
economy in two principal ways. The substantial economic conse-
quences of crime are spread throughout society through the cost of
insurance, and violent crime influences whether and where people
are willing to travel. Moreover, the argument ran, school violence
threatens to disrupt the educational process. And because poorly
152. The extent to which Congress has power to regulate possession is considered be-
low. See infra text accompanying notes 174-86.
153. Cf. United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting a
constitutional challenge to the Drug-Free School Zones Act, which prohibits the sale of
drugs within 1,000 feet of a school), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 911 (1991); United States v.
Thornton, 901 F.2d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 1990) (confirming the congressional finding that
drug trafficking, wherever it occurs, is a national concern that affects interstate commerce).
154. See McDougherty, 920 F.2d at 572 ("There is no legal reason why Congress can-
not choose to punish some behavior affecting commerce more harshly than other behavior,
based upon its detriment to society.").
155. See Thornton, 901 F.2d at 741 (finding that a federal statute mandating an en-
hanced penalty for drug sales near schools is a rational means of reducing the availability
of drugs to school children).
The Gun-Free School Zones Act was obviously designed to reach gun possession by
young school children. Ironically, it could not have been routinely applied to children
under the age of 18 because Congress did not amend the statute governing the criminal
prosecution of juveniles. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994). Thus, although the Act could have
been invoked against high school seniors who, like Lopez, had reached their eighteenth
birthday, the vast majority of school children would not be subject to its sanctions.
Although the government conceded this point, it nonetheless argued that the Act
would increase the likelihood that children who were caught possessing firearms would be
subject to sanctions because the government could institute delinquency proceedings in
federal court if the state courts either lacked jurisdiction or refused to exercise it. Reply
Brief for the United States at 12-14, Lopez (No. 93-1260); see also 18 U.S.C. § 5032(1)
(1994).
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educated children will become less productive members of the
national work force,1 6 the "Nation's economic well-being" is at
risk.57
The majority found that these arguments would lead to virtual-
ly limitless federal power. The "costs of crime" argument, for
example, could result in the federal regulation of everything that
could conceivably lead to violent crime, even though the regulated
activity had only a tenuous link to interstate commerce." 8
"[D]epending on the level of generality," the Court wrote, "any
activity can be looked upon as commercial."'5 9 The "national pro-
ductivity" argument, moreover, would empower Congress to regu-
late anything that relates to economic productivity, including mat-
ters that have traditionally been the states' prerogative to ad-
dress."6
In the field of education, for example, Congress could find
that the curriculum has a substantial effect on classroom learning.
That being true, Congress could impose curricular requirements on
local schools because the quality of the educational process sub-
stantially affects commerce." Noting endless possibilities, the
majority found the government's broad reading of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause an untenable piling of inference
upon inference that would enable Congress to exercise "a general
police power of the sort retained by the States."'' Thus, while
language in some of its prior decisions suggested the Court might
be receptive to additional expansion of Commerce Clause jurisdic-
156. See RESEARCH AND POLICY COMMITTEE, COMM1ITEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT, CHILDREN IN NEED: INVESTMENT STRATEGIES FOR THE EDUCATIONALLY DISAD-
VANTAGED 4 (1987) (predicting that if current trends continue, the work force will be so
poorly educated and ill-equipped that the nation will face a severe employment crisis).
157. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1633.
160. Id. at 1632 (listing marriage, divorce, and child custody as examples).
161. Id. at 1633. Congress does, of course, exert enormous influence on local decision-
making through the power of the purse strings. The Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994, for
example, conditions a state's continued eligibility for federal education money on the
enactment of a law requiring a mandatory one-year expulsion for any student who is
caught with a gun on school grounds. 20 U.S.C. § 8921(b) (1994); cf. Lynn A. Baker,
Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995) (arguing that
the Court should interpret the Spending Clause consistently with the Commerce Clause to
restrict the use of conditional federal funding to regulate the states).
162. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634; cf. Dailey, supra note 64, at 1818 (stating that "without
some substantive limitation on congressional power, federalism becomes nothing more than
an unenforceable promise of congressional self-restraint").
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tion, 63 the Court in Lopez "decline[d] . . . to proceed any fur-
ther" down that road.
64
CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS REDUX
After the Fifth Circuit called the constitutionality of the Gun-
Free School Zones Act into question in Lopez,65 Congress
amended the Act by adopting formal findings that articulate com-
merce-based concerns. They include the following: that crime, espe-
cially crime involving guns and drugs, is a nationwide problem;
that interstate movement of drugs, guns, and gangs aggravates the
crime problem; that guns and ammunition move easily in interstate
commerce and are becoming commonplace around schools; that
raw materials and components used to make guns and ammunition
move interstate; that travelers may refrain from visiting crime-rid-
den parts of the country and parents may keep their children out of
school because of concerns regarding violent crime; that violent
crime in school zones has diminished the quality of education,
which in turn adversely affects interstate commerce; that school
systems and state and local governments cannot control gun-related
crime by themselves; and that Congress has power to act under the
Commerce Clause to safeguard the nation's schools."
While the Lopez Court observed in passing that Congress had
belatedly adopted formal findings, the government did not rely on
them.67 Hence, the Court did not take them into account. But
what if Congress had adopted these findings at the outset? Would
that have saved the statute? The answer is not entirely free from
doubt. The majority would likely have dismissed the findings relat-
ing to the quality of education, keeping children out of school, and
the frequency with which guns are possessed in and around
schools. Those concerns were at the heart of the government's
argument, and the Court had little regard for them.
163. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
164. Id.
165. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1367-68.
166. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1) (1994) (as amended by the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320904 (1994)). Similar findings are
contained in the Senate version of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1995, which is
currently pending in Congress. See S. 890, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1995).
167. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 n.4. In Justice Souter's view, the findings Congress
enacted merely stated what was implicit in the statute and 'at such a conclusory level of
generality" that the government wisely declined to rely on them. Id. at 1656 n.2 (Souter,
J., dissenting).
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The identification of crime as a national problem would likely
have been insufficient to assuage the Court as well. 161 Even dys-
functional families could rationally be found to constitute a national
problem. Marriage, divorce, and child custody matters may pro-
foundly affect an individual's productivity. But the Court made
clear its position that, contrary to the implications of the
government's argument, Congress cannot regulate all activity that is
related to productivity. The government's position would leave the
Court "hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that
Congress is without power to regulate.'
69
The finding concerning the movement of weapons, their com-
ponents, and ammunition in interstate commerce comes closer to
the mark, but the Court's antipathy toward the general premise that
gun possession in school zones is an appropriate subject of federal
regulation could have led it to conclude that the regulated activity
is insufficiently related to commerce.'70 On the other hand, the
court of appeals suggested that the outcome might have been dif-
ferent had Congress adopted a finding that gun possession in
schools substantially affects commerce,' and the Supreme Court
left that prospect dangling. 7 While the court of appeals acknowl-
edged its responsibility to invalidate legislation extending Com-
merce Clause jurisdiction beyond its legitimate bounds, it could
168. Cf. Perez, 402 U.S. at 157-58 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
[lit is not enough to say that loan sharking is a national problem, for all crime
is a national problem. It is not enough to say that some loan sharking has
interstate characteristics, for any crime may have an interstate setting. And the
circumstance that loan sharking has an adverse impact on interstate business is
not a distinguishing attribute, for interstate business suffers from almost all
criminal activity, be it shoplifting or violence in the streets.
d
169. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
170. The problem is compounded because the regulated activity is gun possession in
school zones rather than possession of guns "in or affecting" commerce. See infra text
accompanying notes 174-86.
171. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1368 (5th Cir. 1993).
172. The Court's silence on this point led Justice Souter to believe that such findings
might have saved the statute. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1655-57 (Souter, J., dissenting). But,
Justice Souter thought the Court's reliance on the absence of findings misplaced. Findings
merely reveal the factual predicate that prompted Congress to act. The enactment of the
Gun-Free School Zones Act itself implies a finding that gun possession in school zones
affects commerce. That being true, the only question for the Court is not whether the
finding was correct, but is, instead, "whether the legislative judgment is within the realm
of reason." Id. at 1656.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
find no decision in the last fifty years in which the Supreme Court
ruled that a congressional finding lacked a rational basis.'73
REGULATING POSSESSION
Apart from the unresolved conundrums discussed above, the
Court interjected yet another uncertainty into the equation. The
Court faulted the Act because it did not contain a jurisdictional
element that "would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the
firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce."'' At
first blush, this statement does not ring true. 75 Suppose, for ex-
ample, the statute contained a jurisdictional element requiring the
gun to have previously moved in interstate commerce. Absent
proof that the gun was manufactured out of state or was otherwise
transported from one state to another, there would be no crime.
But that is merely a factual inquiry. Once the jurisdictional fact is
proven, the relevant inquiry is not whether this particular gun pos-
session affects commerce, but is whether such gun possessions,
considered in the aggregate, substantially affect commerce.
176
Other contextual concerns must be taken into account, howev-
er. The Court's reference to a case-by-case inquiry came at the
beginning of a brief discussion of United States v. Bass."7 In
Bass, the Court construed a statute forbidding convicted felons to
receive, possess, or transport a firearm in or affecting com-
merce. 17  Finding the statute ambiguous on the question whether
the "in or affecting commerce" language applied to receipt and
possession as well as transportation, the Court held that the phrase
modified all three antecedents. 179 Absent a clearer manifestation
of congressional intent to alter traditional federal-state relations, the
173. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1363 n.43. But cf Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclama-
tion Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating
that "simply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects
interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so"). The same would have been true,
of course, had the court searched for a decision in the last 50 years in which the Su-
preme Court struck down a statute as an unconstitutional exercise of the commerce power.
174. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
175. See United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 587-88 (3d Cir.) (rejecting the argument
that Lopez requires a case-by-case analysis of whether the particular act in question affects
commerce), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 681 (1995).
176. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); see also supra note 107.
177. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
178. Id. at 337.
179. Id. at 347.
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Court felt obliged to adopt the narrower construction.' ° Thus, it
was incumbent on the government to prove a connection between
the defendant's possession and commerce, a task it did not under-
take in Bass.' The government proved that the defendant pos-
sessed a firearm, but it did not establish any nexus with interstate
commerce.1
Because it was decided on statutory construction grounds, the
Lopez Court observed, Bass "interpreted the statute to reserve the
constitutional question whether Congress could regulate, without
more, the 'mere possession' of firearms."'83 This passage can best
be understood in the context of a footnote in Bass from which the
"mere possession" theme emerged.
In light of our disposition of the case, we do not reach the
question whether, upon appropriate findings, Congress can
constitutionally punish the "mere possession" of firearms;
thus, we need not consider the relevance, in that connec-
tion, of our recent decision in Perez v. United States, 402
U.S. 146 (1971).184
All told, then, the Lopez Court's reference to a case-by-case inqui-
ry into the nexus between gun possession and commerce, and its
subsequent allusion to the unresolved question whether Congress
can regulate "mere possession," boils down to this: as a class of
activities, gun possession-standing alone-may not bear a suffi-
cient nexus to commerce to warrant federal regulation.
Thus, if Congress had declared that gun possession plus atten-
dant circumstances (e.g., possession by a felon or possession in a
school zone) substantially affects commerce, that finding, standing
alone, might have been insufficient to support commerce-based
criminal jurisdiction. But if, in addition, Congress had added a
jurisdictional element to the statute, the outlook would have signifi-
cantly improved. Indeed, the Court's holding in Bass makes clear
that Congress can regulate possession of firearms in or affecting
180. Id. at 349-50.
181. Id. at 339.
182. Id. at 337-38.
183. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339 n.4
(1971) and citing United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 448 (1953)
(plurality opinion)); cf. id. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that any interpretation
of the commerce power that suggests that Congress can regulate mere gun possession
needs to be reexamined).
184. Bass, 404 U.S. at 339 n.4.
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commerce, and its holding in Scarborough'85 plainly confirms that
the possession need not have a contemporaneous connection with
commerce. 1
86
Hence, the lesson of Lopez, Bass, and Scarborough is that
Lopez's hypothetical possession of the gun ten years after it was
shipped in interstate commerce can be reached under the Com-
merce Clause because his possession plus the jurisdictional fact of
movement in commerce equals more than "mere possession."
LIFE AFrER LOPEZ
Lopez was only the first of two closely watched Commerce
Clause cases the Court decided in its 1994-95 term. The second,
United States v. Robertson,"7 was decided barely a week later. In
Robertson, the defendant, an Arizona resident, acquired an Alaskan
gold mine with the proceeds of drug crimes. He purchased mining
equipment and supplies in Los Angeles and shipped them to the
mine. He also hired a number of out-of-state employees to travel
to Alaska and work in the mine. Although most of the gold pro-
duced by the mine was sold to Alaskan refiners, Robertson person-
ally took about $30,000 worth of gold out of the state.'
Robertson was convicted of violating RICO by using racke-
teering proceeds to acquire and operate an enterprise engaged in or
affecting interstate commerce.'89 On appeal, he argued that the
activities of the mine did not affect commerce. In a stunning de-
parture from settled Commerce Clause precedent, the Ninth Circuit
agreed.' Rejecting the government's argument that the interstate
movement of supplies, employees, and Robertson himself supplied
a sufficient link to commerce, the court noted that the mine was a
relatively small and entirely local operation and that Robertson kept
only "a few nuggets" of gold for himself.'9 To hold otherwise,
185. See supra text accompanying notes 109-13.
186. Accord Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212 (1976) (construing a provision that
prohibits convicted felons from receiving a firearm that has been transported in interstate
commerce). The nexus between the receipt or possession of the firearm and its transporta-
tion interstate is considered supra in notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
187. 115 S. Ct. 1732 (1995) (per curiam).
188. Id. at 1732-33.
189. United States v. Robertson, 15 F.3d 862, 867-68 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct.
1732 (1995).
190. Id. at 866.
191. Id. at 868-69 (citing Musick v. Burke, 913 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1990)). Although
the court of appeals recognized that activity having only a minimal effect on commerce
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the court posited, would be tantamount to finding that all local
Alaskan businesses affect commerce because Alaska is geographi-
cally isolated and its businesses acquire most of their equipment
and supplies from out of state."9
In a brief per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed.'93
While the parties had framed the issue as one of whether the gold
mine's operations "affected" commerce, the high Court found it
unnecessary to resolve that point because the evidence clearly
established that the mine was "engaged in" commerce. Robertson's
purchase of out-of-state equipment and supplies, hiring out-of-state
employees, and taking fifteen percent of the mine's production out
of Alaska all demonstrated that the mine was engaged in com-
merce. 4 "[A] corporation is generally engaged in commerce
when it is itself directly engaged in the production, distribution, or
acquisition of goods and services in interstate commerce."'95 The
"affecting commerce" standard, considered at length in Lopez,
applies only when it is necessary to assess the relationship between
purely intrastate activity and commerce. 96
Robertson was, as it should have been, an easy case."9 The
question is whether it sheds any light on Lopez. Standing alone, it
seems doubtful that it does. But when considered with the Court's
contemporaneous denial of certiorari in two arson cases and with
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lopez, it portends more stability
in Commerce Clause jurisprudence than some Court watchers ini-
tially predicted.'
would suffice, it espoused the view that drawing supplies from the general stream of
commerce is insufficient. The activities upon which the government relied had, at most,
an incidental effect on commerce, according to the court. Id.
192. Id. at 869.
193. United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732, 1733 (1995) (per curiam).
194. Id.
195. Id. (quoting United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271,
283 (1975)) (internal quotations omitted).
The Court also cited American Building Maintenance for the premise that a
business's local purchases of supplies manufactured out of state would not establish that
the business was engaged in commerce. Instead, the relevant question would be whether
the purchase of supplies manufactured out of state substantially affects commerce. Id.
196. Id.
197. In reaching a conclusion that flatly contradicted a substantial body of Commerce
Clause precedent, the Ninth Circuit dispatched the issue in five paragraphs that relied
exclusively on three intra-circuit RICO decisions. See United States v. Robertson, 15 F.3d
862, 868-69 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1732 (1995).
198. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Court Is Not a Right Wing Nut, LEGAL TIMES, May 1,
1995, at 26 (observing that some Court watchers' initial reaction to Lopez was anticipa-
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The arson cases the Court declined to review were both Fourth
Circuit decisions-United States v. Ramey"' and United States v.
Moore.' The defendants in Ramey were convicted of burning a
building used in an activity affecting commerce."° The building
at issue was a trailer occupied by an interracial couple. The defen-
dants contended on appeal that their crime was beyond the reach
of the commerce power because the trailer was a private residence
and hence did not affect commerce.'
The Supreme Court had previously affirmed that the arson
statute is a valid exercise of full congressional power under the
Commerce Clause in Russell v. United States. 3 In Russell, a
unanimous Court ruled that an apartment building the defendant
rented out and treated as a business was engaged in an activity
affecting commerce.
The rental of real estate is unquestionably such an activity.
We need not rely on the connection between the market for
residential units and the "interstate movement of people" to
recognize that the local rental of an apartment unit is mere-
ly an element of a much broader commercial market in
rental properties. The congressional power to regulate the
class of activities that constitute the rental market for real
estate includes the power to regulate individual activity
within that class.2"4
tion of a coming constitutional law revolution). Compare Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1657
(Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that Lopez is a "misstep," not an epochal case-but beware
that "[n]ot every epochal case comes in epochal trappings") and United States v. Bishop,
66 F.3d 569, 590 (3d Cir.) ("despite protestations to the contrary, the winds have not
shifted that much"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 681 (1995) and United States v. Martin, 63
F.3d 1422, 1427 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Lopez ... suggests that the winds of interstate com-
merce jurisprudence may have shifted, albeit slightly, against ... expansive understand-
ings" of commerce-based jurisdiction.) with Bishop, 66 F.3d at 603 (Becker, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("Lopez is not just another Supreme Court case, but a
watershed.").
199. 24 F.3d 602 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1838 (1995).
200. No. 93-5273, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 14314 (4th Cir. June 10, 1994) (per curiam)
(reported in case table format at 25 F.3d 1042), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1838 (1995).
Justice Scalia went on record in Ramey and Moore as favoring the granting of the peti-
tions, vacating the judgments, and remanding the cases for reconsideration in light of
Lopez. See Ramey, 115 S. Ct. at 1839; Moore, 115 S. Ct. at 1838.
201. Ramey, 24 F.3d at 602. The defendants were convicted for the arson under 18
U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994).
202. Ramey, 24 F.3d at 606-07.
203. 471 U.S. 858 (1985).
204. Id. at 862 (footnotes omitted).
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Although Russell left unresolved the question raised in Ramey, the
Russell Court observed that Congress intended to protect a broad
spectrum of properties, including all business property.'0 The ex-
tent to which the statute protected private homes, on the other
hand, was less clear according to the Court. 6 Although few cas-
es of arson involving a private residence seem to have been prose-
cuted, several courts have found a sufficient nexus between private
homes and commerce to support federal arson convictions.2 The
court in Ramey followed suit on the ground that the trailer received
its electricity from an interstate power grid."'
205. Id. at 860.
206. Id. at 861-62 (noting that the legislative history also suggested that Congress might
not have the power to reach the arson of a private home). Whatever limitations the arson
statute may have in a given factual context, it often works in tandem with other federal
crimes. See John Panneton, Federalizing Fires: The Evolving Federal Response to Arson
Related Crimes, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 151, 161-92 (1985) (stating that some arsons lend
themselves to prosecution under the mail and wire fraud statutes, RICO, the Gun Control
Act of 1968, and the Travel Act).
207. See, e.g., United States v. Stillwell, 900 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir.) (finding that
receipt of natural gas that traveled in interstate commerce is a sufficient link with com-
merce), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 838 (1990); United States v. Zabic, 745 F.2d 464, 470-71
(7th Cir. 1984) (finding that a rental apartment building was used for commercial activity,
but receipt of natural gas originating from out of state could provide an independent basis
for finding that its use affected commerce); United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 231-
32 (2d Cir.) (finding that a university building that sold food that had moved in interstate
commerce or that operated on fuel that originated from out of state has the requisite
effect on commerce), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 (1981).
In other reported cases involving arsons committed against residences, the courts
found a more direct commercial connection. See, e.g., United States v. Parsons, 993 F.2d
38, 40 (4th Cir.) (finding that a single family house used as rental property is engaged in
an activity affecting commerce), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 266 (1993); United States v.
Shively, 927 F.2d 804, 808 (5th Cir.) (finding "some relationship" between defendant's
house and automobile and his trucking business), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1209 (1991). But
see United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 527-28 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding (post-
Lopez) that a private residence that receives natural gas from out-of-state sources is nei-
ther engaged in nor used in commerce and does not have a substantial effect on com-
merce).
208. United States v. Ramey, 24 F.3d 602, 607 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1838 (1995). Relying on Ramey, the court in Moore likewise held that a private home
was used in an activity affecting commerce. United States v. Moore, No. 93-5273, 1994
U.S. App. LEXIS 14314, at *19-*20 (4th Cir. June 10, 1994) (per curium) (reported in
case table format at 25 F.3d 1042), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1838 (1995). Although the
Moore court began its recitation of commerce-related evidence with the home's connection
with interstate gas and telephone lines, the court enumerated other facts, including the
interstate marketing of the home for sale, that supported the conclusion that the home was
used in an activity affecting commerce. Id. at *11-*12. Justice Scalia's vote to remand
Moore and Ramey for reconsideration in light of Lopez, see supra note 200, raises the
issue of whether he views Lopez as an invitation to revisit Russell, which equated partici-
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Read in light of Lopez, Ramey looks like business as usual.
The Ramey defendants were not commercial or economic actors.
They committed a racially motivated crime. Like gang members
who bum down a rival gang's headquarters, a skinhead who bombs
a synagogue, or a paramilitary member who blows up a govern-
ment agent's car, the Ramey defendants violated the arson statute
even though they were non-commercial actors who lacked an eco-
nomic motive."°
Ramey is a step removed from NOW, moreover."' The abor-
tion protesters in NOW at least directed their protests against com-
mercial enterprises. In Ramey, the defendants directed their violence
against non-commercial private individuals."' Their crime was not
connected with and did not arise out of a commercial transaction.
But like the abortion protesters in NOW, the Ramey defendants'
arson could drain money from the economy by disrupting the flow
of electricity to the trailer. While the amount of electricity con-
sumed by the trailer's occupants would amount to only a "pittance
of energy" from the grid, when all buildings receiving energy from
the grid are considered in the aggregate, it becomes clear that their
consumption affects commerce. Indeed, not only does this class of
activities affect commerce, it is "the raison d'etre of an interstate
business." ' Thus, in contrast with the gun possession in Lopez,
Ramey's arson was in one sense an economic activity that could,
"through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect ... interstate
commerce."
213
pation in the real estate market with engaging in an activity affecting commerce.
209. The petitioners in Moore conceded that bombing a police station or a state univer-
sity laboratory where military research is conducted would fit within the confines of the
arson statute, notwithstanding that the buildings might not technically qualify as business-
es. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court at 9, Moore v. United States,
(No. 94-642) (Oct. 6, 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1838 (1995). But the activities con-
ducted from those buildings affect commerce just as surely as activities conducted from
reproductive health clinics. See supra text accompanying notes 45-59.
A recent Sixth Circuit decision reaffirmed the constitutionality of the arson statute. In
United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208 (6th Cir. 1995), the court found that, because the
arson statute requires proof of a jurisdictional element linking the regulated activity to
commerce, it is distinguishable from the statute in Lopez. Id. at 1213-14. The building at
issue in Sherlin was a residential dormitory on a college campus. The court concluded
without hesitation that "the educational business of Lee College was an activity affecting
interstate commerce, and Ellis Hall was a building used in that activity." Id. at 1213.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 45-64.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 199-202.
212. Ramey, 24 F.3d at 607.
213. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
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The Court's denial of certiorari in Ramey,"4 viewed in light
of the Kennedy concurrence in Lopez, suggests that Lopez may not
have dealt a serious blow to commerce-based criminal jurisdiction
after all.215
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, sounded a note
of caution. The history of the Court's Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence during the transition to a national economy "counsels great
214. Two subsequent denials of certiorari are also worthy of note. First, the Court de-
nied certiorari in a carjacking case in which the defendant challenged the statute as an
impermissible exercise of Commerce Clause jurisdiction. See United States v. Williams, 51
F.3d 1004 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 258 (1995). The Eleventh Circuit joined
the four other courts of appeal that had upheld the statute as a valid exercise of the com-
merce power. Id. at 1008-09. The Court's refusal to hear the case drew no dissent. The
carjacking statute and its implications for commerce-based jurisdiction are discussed supra
in text accompanying notes 84-98.
More recently (and, perhaps, more notably), the Court denied certiorari in Cargill,
Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995), a suit challenging the Army Corps of
Engineers' jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act over private property containing two
seasonal rainwater ponds that attracted migratory waterfowl.
The Clean Water Act extends to waters used or susceptible of use in interstate or
foreign commerce and to intrastate waters that may affect interstate or foreign commerce.
Id. at 408 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (1995)). A preamble to regulations promulgated by
the Corps suggests that waters used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird Trea-
ties or that are used by other migratory birds that cross state lines are also within the
ambit of the Act. Id. (citing 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (1986)).
The district court held, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, that the seasonal presence of
migratory birds at the ponds provided a sufficient connection with interstate commerce to
sustain the Corps of Engineers' jurisdiction. Id.
The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari prompted a dissent from Justice Thomas,
who argued that to base jurisdiction on the comings and goings of self-propelled airborne
interstate travelers "likely stretches Congress' Commerce Clause powers beyond the break-
ing point." Id. at 409. He thought the case raised compelling constitutional questions
about the outer limits of jurisdiction to regulate land use under the Clean Water Act, id.,
but he was the lone dissenter from the Court's refusal to hear the case.
215. Another development worth noting is an unheralded pre-Lopez decision from the
Court's 1994-95 term. In Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 836
(1995), the Court construed a provision in the Federal Arbitration Act that applies to
every contract "evidencing a transaction involving commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis
added). Equating the phrase "involving commerce" with "affecting commerce," the Court,
citing Russell, found that these terms signaled an intent to exercise full congressional
power under the Commerce Clause. Also finding that a broad interpretation of these terms
was consistent with the purposes of the Act, the Court held that the terms "evidencing"
and "involving" commerce do not restrict the Act's application. Thus, even though there
was no evidence that the parties contemplated that the transaction at issue would be in
interstate commerce, the Act applied if the transaction in fact turned out to have involved
interstate commerce. Id. at 839-43.
Judge Frank Easterbrook, who views Lopez as a "dud," calls Terminix the most
significant Commerce Clause case decided in the 1994 term. Constitutional Law Confer-
ence Probes Impact of Supreme Court's 1994-95 Term, 64 U.S.L.W. 2240, 2253-54
(1995).
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restraint" in considering whether to strike down an exercise of the
commerce power.2 16 That history teaches at least two lessons:
first, the use of content-based boundaries to define the limits of the
commerce power has proved to be inexact; and second, both the
Court and the legal system "have an immense stake in the stability
of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it has evolved to this
point."217 Thus, Justice Kennedy made clear that in his view,
Lopez in no way calls into question the validity of Heart of Atlan-
ta, Katzenbach, Perez, and other linchpins of modem Commerce
Clause jurisprudence." 8
Although the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence gave
Justice Kennedy "some pause" about the holding in Lopez,219 he
was unable to find any evident commercial purpose in the Gun-
Free School Zones Act or its legislative history.2" By intruding
into two areas-education and crime-that are traditionally matters
of state concern, the Act disturbs the proper balance between feder-
al and state power.2  Thus, he joined what he believed to be the
Court's "necessary though limited holding." 2
Lopez was a 5-4 decision. With Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor hewing to the Court's past precedents and characterizing
the holding as "limited," it seems unlikely that a call to revisit the
last sixty years of Commerce Clause jurisprudence would command
a majority of the Court today.2"
216. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
217. Id. at 1637. Justice Kennedy's opinion includes a homily on the importance of
stare decisis, which forecloses the Court "from reverting to an understanding of commerce
that would serve only an 18th-century economy." Id. This is presumably addressed to
Justice Thomas, whose separate concurrence discusses 18th-century definitions of com-
merce in a favorable light, Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1643-46 (Thomas, J., concurring), disap-
proves of the substantial effects test, id. at 1649-50, advocates a reexamination of com-
merce-based jurisdiction, id. at 1650-51, and suggests that he might be willing to revert
"to the original understanding" of commerce-based jurisdiction, but recognizes that reliance
interests and stare decisis might convince his colleagues that the Court "cannot wipe the
slate clean." Id. at 1650 n.8.
218. See id. at 1637 (stating that "these and like authorities are within the fair ambit of
the Court's practical conception of commercial regulation").
219. Id. at 1634.
220. Id. at 1640.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1634.
223. In view of Justice Thomas's concurrence in Lopez, see supra note 217, Justice
Scalia's vote to grant certiorari in Ramey and Moore, see supra note 200, and Justice
Thomas's dissent from the denial of certiorari in Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct.
407 (1995), see supra note 214, a reconstituted Court's direction in future years may be
another matter.
[Vol. 46:801
1996] CRIME CONTROL AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 839
THE LOPEZ LEGACY
If, as Justice Kennedy posits, the holding in Lopez is limited to
exceptional cases, and if, as Justice Souter suggests, appropriate
legislative findings might have saved the Act, 4 what would the
significance of Lopez be?
One possible scenario is that Congress could (and perhaps
should) view Lopez as a warning shot across the bow. For despite
the measured tone of the majority opinion, the dissenters viewed
the decision as a radical misstep that injects considerable uncer-
tainty into Commerce Clause jurisprudence.' Thus, Congress
could respond by becoming politically more cautious in deciding
what it will criminalize. But Congress is an institution that is all
too eager to look tough on crime, so the politics of crime control
make it highly unlikely that Congress will become a model of
restraint.' An alternative scenario is that Lopez will have a prac-
tical (if nominal) impact on Congress. To satisfy Lopez, Congress
can either dutifully engage in legislative fact-finding or, as it nor-
mally does, include an express jurisdictional element in laws def'm-
ing crimes under the commerce power.'
But the real significance of Lopez may be its symbolic value.
The Gun-Free School Zones Act federalized a local crime. It was
part of a burgeoning body of federal criminal law, much of which
overlaps with or merely duplicates state crimes.' Notably, the
unrestrained expansion of this body of law has occurred without
224. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1654 (Souter, J., dissenting).
225. See id. at 1654, 1657 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that the commer-
cial/noncommercial distinction suffers from "hopeless porosity" and constitutes a "mis-
step"); id. at 1662, 1664 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority's decision "cre-
ates three serious legal problems"--among them is that it "threatens legal uncertainty in
an area of law that, until this case, seemed reasonably well settled").
Indeed, Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion concedes that requiring case-by-case
determinations about whether particular activity is commercial or noncommercial could
"result in legal uncertainty." Id. at 1633.
226. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium,
108 HARV. L. REV. 27, 71 (1994) (noting that "there are few interest groups to derail
feel-good, do-something federal crime bills").
227. Indeed, that is precisely how Congress proposes to revitalize the Gun-Free School
Zones Act. See supra note 98; cf. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 226, at 71 ("Although
ordinarily the Court might be expected to assist the current Congress by not requiring that
it return to a statutory area and fix small mistakes, in this area the Court is an active
opponent of Congress and seems to be throwing up what roadblocks it can.").
228. See supra notes 75-77, 84-86 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying
notes 233-40.
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regard for its effect on the federal courts. Chief Justice Rehnquist,
who wrote for the majority in Lopez, has been sounding the alarm
for several years. In his year-end reports to the judiciary, he has
warned that the federal courts are limited resources and that un-
checked growth of federal criminal law threatens to create a crisis
in the federal justice system.229 These concerns have been echoed
by the Federal Courts Study Committee," the Judicial Confer-
ence,231 and the Judicial Conference's Committee on Long Range
Planning.232
Not only have the judiciary's concerns gone unheeded by Con-
gress-they have been openly ignored. The 1994 crime bill,1 3 for
example, federalized drug-related drive-by shootingsp4 and partici-
pation in local street gangs.2 35 And despite criticisms that it feder-
alized divorce law 6 and would seriously encumber the federal
courts, 7 Title IV of the bill, the Violence Against Women Act,
invokes Commerce Clause jurisdiction to federalize domestic abuse
crimes and violation of state protective orders. 8 Worse still, a
229. See William H. Rehnquist, 1993 Year-End Report on the Judiciary 4-5, reprinted
in 26 THE THIRD BRANCH 1, 3 (Jan. 1994); William H. Rehnquist, 1992 Year-End Report
on the Judiciary 1, 3-4, reprinted in 25 THE THIRD BRANCH 1, 1-3 (Jan. 1993); William
H. Rehnquist, 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 5, reprinted in 24 THE
THIRD BRANCH 1, 3 (Jan. 1992).
230. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, April 2, 1990, at 35-36
(stating that "[tihe federal courts' most pressing problems . . . stem from unprecedented
numbers of federal narcotics prosecutions" and that the courts' caseload crisis can only be
resolved by "returning the federal courts to their proper, limited role in dealing with
crime").
231. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 57-58 (March 12, 1991) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT]; see also 140
Cong. Rec. S6090 (daily ed. May 19, 1994) (Federalization of State Prosecutions: Position
of the Judicial Conference of the United States, enclosed in Letter from Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Presiding Officer of the Judicial Conference, to Rep. Jack Brooks, Chairman of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary).
232. A draft report of the Long Range Planning Committee recommends, inter alia, the
repeal of existing criminal provisions that do not serve an essential federal purpose. COM-
M'ITEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRO-
POSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS, DRAFT FOR PUBLIC COMMENT 22
(Nov. 1994); see also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal
Judiciary, 43 EMORY L.J. 1147, 1178 (1994).
233. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
234. Id. § 6008 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 36).
235. Id. § 150001 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 521).
236. W. John Moore, The High Price of Good Intentions, 25 NAT'L. J. 1140, 1140
(1993).
237. William H. Rehnquist, 1992 Year-End Report on the Judiciary 3-4, reprinted in 25
THE THIRD BRANCH, 1, 2-3 (Jan. 1993).
238. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, § 40221 (codified as
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defeated amendment to the 1994 bill would have federalized virtu-
ally every state crime committed with a gun. The provision had
been overwhelmingly passed in a 1993 Senate crime bill,' 9 not-.
withstanding estimates that the provision would have swamped the
federal courts with more than 600,000 new prosecutions a year.2"
But it is not just the federal judiciary that is concerned. The
National Association of Attorneys General,24 the National Confer-
ence of State Legislatures,242 and the National Conference of
State Chief Justices243 have all expressed serious concerns about
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2261) (prohibiting crossing state lines to injure a spouse or
intimate partner).
239. H.R. 3355 incorporated Senate amendments and was passed by the Senate (En-
grossed Amendments), November 19, 1993, Item 340: Sec. 2405, by a vote of 95-4. See
Status report on H.R. 3355 on November 19, 1993, available in Legi-Slate, Inc., an elec-
tronic data base; see also 139 CONG. Rec. S17095, S17148 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1993).
240. Naftali Bendavid, Reading Crime Bill's Fine Print; Overlooked Amendments Draw
Fire as Unconstitutional, Overly Harsh, LEGAL TIMES, March 7, 1994, at 1, 19.
In the words of the bill's inimitable sponsor, Senator Alphonse D'Amato, "I could
care a hoot about the fact that it may create a burden for the courts .... [tihe predators
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CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the rampant centralization of power, particularly police power, in
the federal government.2" And in 1993, an unusual coalition of
thirty national criminal justice organizations adopted a policy state-
ment decrying the continued federalization of state crimes.245 Sim-
ply put, despite widespread criticism of the race to federalize ev-
erything in sight, Congress continues undaunted down the road to
federalized crime.4
Lopez is a counterpoint to that trend.247 Sounding strong fed-
eralism themes, it is a reminder that, contrary to contemporary
justices adopted a formal resolution condemning the federal crime bill on the ground, inter
alia, that its "indiscriminate federalization of crimes" invalidates state law principles).
244. The National Governors' Association also proposed adoption of a policy that "ex-
presses governors' concern that attempts to expand federal criminal law could undermine
state and local crime-fighting efforts." George Embrey, Governors Want More Help, Fewer
Restraints from Washington, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 17, 1994, at 3B; see also George
Allen, A Federalist Perspective on the Crime Problem, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
535, 535 (1995) (noting that Governor Allen of Virginia posited that state governments
are best equipped to develop and implement effective solutions to the crime problem, and
that efforts to federalize crime are more politically motivated than based on principle).
Indeed, the National Governors' Association, the National Conference of State Legis-
latures, the National League of Cities, and the National Association of Counties were
among seven amici who joined together in a brief supporting Lopez and his effort to
have the Gun-Free School Zones Act stricken as an invalid exercise of federal commerce
power. See Brief for National Conference of State Legislatures, National Governors' Asso-
ciation, National League of Cities, National Association of Counties, International
City/County Management Association, and National Institute of Municipal Law Officers,
Joined by the National School Boards Association, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respon-
dent, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (No. 93-1260).
245. See 30 Organizations Call for Shift in Criminal Justice Policy, CRIM. JUST.
NEWSL., July 15, 1993, at 3, 3-4. The policy statement urges a halt to further expansion
of federalization into areas of traditional state authority absent agreement among state,
local, and federal officials that the need for an increased federal presence is clear and
compelling. Id. at 4. Included among the organizations that joined the coalition are the
American Correctional Association, the American Jail Association, the National Association
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Annual Meeting Features Programs on Death Penalty Litigation, DOJ priorities, 57 CRIM.
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federal district courts have discretion to stay actions for declaratory judgments during
pendency of parallel proceedings in state court-pursuit of federal declaratory action might
result in "'[g]ratuitous interference"' with state proceeding (quoting Brillhart v. Excess
Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942)); Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1082 (1993)
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thought, congressional power under the Commerce Clause is not
unlimited, that states have primary authority to define and enforce
criminal laws, and that much of what Congress has enacted need-
lessly alters the balance between federal and state jurisdiction."
It is also a reminder that the Court's policy of deferring to con-
gressional judgments is not a presumption of congressional infalli-
bility.249 Admittedly, the Court's role remains limited to determin-
ing whether Congress acted within the "bounds of legal power," re-
gardless of whether Congress acted wisely or not." But Lopez
reminds us that in defining the outer bounds of power, the Court
also delineates the boundaries of reasonable legislative action."'
And under a rational basis analysis, power and wisdom are inextri-
cably intertwined.
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Court may feel that it must communicate its concern to Congress clearly, come what
may').
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Law, 7 HARv. L. REV. 129, 148 (1893).
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